Timeline · 1995–2026
Thirty years of VPN and proxy tunnels
Tunnels started out hiding what you send. As censors learned to spot them, they had to hide that they were tunnels at all. These are the turning points, with their status in four censored countries today.
Status in Iran, China, Russia, Turkmenistan:✓ works~ degraded✕ blocked– no dataoutlined = inferred
1995–2007: private, not hidden
The first VPNs were built for offices and remote workers. They encrypt well, but they use fixed ports and clear handshakes, so a filter can pick them out at once.
~1996
PPTP
Microsoft's early VPN. Broken encryption; removed from iPhones.
- Iran: Blocked (inferred)
- China: Blocked (inferred)
- Russia: Blocked (inferred)
- Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)
2001
OpenVPN
The classic open-source VPN. Flexible, but heavy and easy to detect.
- Iran: No data (inferred)
- China: Blocked (inferred)
- Russia: Blocked
- Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)
2005
IKEv2/IPsec
The VPN built into iPhones, Macs and Windows. Fast and runs in the system kernel.
- Iran: Degraded
- China: Blocked (inferred)
- Russia: Blocked
- Turkmenistan: No data
2012–2016: look like nothing
Shadowsocks took a different line: encrypt everything so the traffic has no pattern to match. WireGuard arrived in the same years, small, fast and silent when idle, but with no attempt to hide.
2012 · AEAD 2017
Shadowsocks
The original anti-censorship proxy: encrypt everything so it looks like random noise.
- Iran: Works
- China: Blocked
- Russia: Degraded
- Turkmenistan: No data
2015 · stable 2020
WireGuard
The modern VPN: small, fast, and silent when idle. Not built to hide.
- Iran: Blocked
- China: Blocked (inferred)
- Russia: Blocked
- Turkmenistan: Blocked
2015
VMess
V2Ray's original protocol. Still everywhere, but replaced by VLESS.
- Iran: No data
- China: Blocked
- Russia: No data
- Turkmenistan: No data
2017–2022: look like the web
Random-looking traffic became a signal of its own: China has detected fully encrypted traffic since 2021. So tools moved inside ordinary HTTPS, and others reached out through volunteers and DNS.
2017
Trojan
Looks exactly like a normal HTTPS website, because it is one.
- Iran: Degraded
- China: Degraded
- Russia: Degraded
- Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)
~2019
Tor Snowflake
Reaches Tor through volunteers' browsers, looking like a video call.
- Iran: Works
- China: Degraded
- Russia: Works
- Turkmenistan: No data
2020
VLESS
Xray's flagship: a minimal protocol that leaves encryption to TLS or REALITY.
- Iran: Works
- China: Works
- Russia: Works
- Turkmenistan: Blocked
2020
DNS tunnel (dnstt)
Hides data inside DNS lookups. Very slow, but works when almost nothing else does.
- Iran: Works
- China: No data
- Russia: No data
- Turkmenistan: No data
2022
Shadowsocks 2022
The modern Shadowsocks: fixed keys, replay protection, faster.
- Iran: Works
- China: Degraded
- Russia: Degraded
- Turkmenistan: No data
2023: borrow a real site
REALITY removed the need for a domain or certificate by borrowing a real website's handshake. The same year, Hysteria2 made QUIC practical on bad links, and AmneziaWG gave WireGuard a disguise.
2023
REALITY
Borrows a real website's TLS handshake. No domain or certificate needed.
- Iran: Works
- China: Works
- Russia: Works
- Turkmenistan: Blocked
2023
Hysteria2
A QUIC proxy built for bad, lossy links. Looks like an HTTP/3 website.
- Iran: Works
- China: Degraded
- Russia: Degraded
- Turkmenistan: Blocked
2023 · v2 2025 · v3.1 2026
AmneziaWG
WireGuard with disguise: junk packets and random sizes so the handshake doesn't match.
- Iran: Works
- China: No data
- Russia: Works
- Turkmenistan: Degraded
2024–2026: the current edge
The newest work splits traffic into ordinary web requests and hides more of the connection itself. These have fewer apps and less field data, so treat their status as early.
2024
XHTTP
Splits the proxy into ordinary HTTP requests. Passes almost any CDN or middlebox.
- Iran: Degraded
- China: Works (inferred)
- Russia: No data
- Turkmenistan: Degraded
2024
Tor WebTunnel
Hides a Tor bridge behind a real website.
- Iran: Works
- China: Works
- Russia: Degraded
- Turkmenistan: No data
2025
AnyTLS
A newer TLS proxy that pads traffic to hide the TLS-inside-TLS pattern.
- Iran: Works
- China: No data
- Russia: No data
- Turkmenistan: No data
RFC 2026
ECH
Encrypts the website name in the TLS hello.
- Iran: No data
- China: No data
- Russia: Degraded
- Turkmenistan: No data
What works in 2026
Six techniques that people actually choose between today. Most of this comes from user reports, often from one ISP and a few people.
| Technique | Iran | China | Russia | Turkmenistan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VLESS + REALITY | Iran: Works | China: Works | Russia: Works | Turkmenistan: Blocked |
| Hysteria2 | Iran: Works | China: Degraded | Russia: Degraded | Turkmenistan: Blocked |
| AmneziaWG | Iran: Works | China: No data | Russia: Works | Turkmenistan: Degraded |
| VLESS via CDN | Iran: Degraded | China: Works (inferred) | Russia: No data | Turkmenistan: Degraded |
| Tor Snowflake | Iran: Works | China: Degraded | Russia: Works | Turkmenistan: No data |
| WireGuard | Iran: Blocked | China: Blocked (inferred) | Russia: Blocked | Turkmenistan: Blocked |