Tunnel Atlas

Timeline · 1995–2026

Thirty years of VPN and proxy tunnels

Tunnels started out hiding what you send. As censors learned to spot them, they had to hide that they were tunnels at all. These are the turning points, with their status in four censored countries today.

Status in Iran, China, Russia, Turkmenistan:✓ works~ degraded✕ blocked– no dataoutlined = inferred

1995–2007: private, not hidden

The first VPNs were built for offices and remote workers. They encrypt well, but they use fixed ports and clear handshakes, so a filter can pick them out at once.

  1. ~1996

    PPTP

    Microsoft's early VPN. Broken encryption; removed from iPhones.

    • Iran: Blocked (inferred)
    • China: Blocked (inferred)
    • Russia: Blocked (inferred)
    • Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)
  2. 2001

    OpenVPN

    The classic open-source VPN. Flexible, but heavy and easy to detect.

    • Iran: No data (inferred)
    • China: Blocked (inferred)
    • Russia: Blocked
    • Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)
  3. 2005

    IKEv2/IPsec

    The VPN built into iPhones, Macs and Windows. Fast and runs in the system kernel.

    • Iran: Degraded
    • China: Blocked (inferred)
    • Russia: Blocked
    • Turkmenistan: No data

2012–2016: look like nothing

Shadowsocks took a different line: encrypt everything so the traffic has no pattern to match. WireGuard arrived in the same years, small, fast and silent when idle, but with no attempt to hide.

  1. 2012 · AEAD 2017

    Shadowsocks

    The original anti-censorship proxy: encrypt everything so it looks like random noise.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: Blocked
    • Russia: Degraded
    • Turkmenistan: No data
  2. 2015 · stable 2020

    WireGuard

    The modern VPN: small, fast, and silent when idle. Not built to hide.

    • Iran: Blocked
    • China: Blocked (inferred)
    • Russia: Blocked
    • Turkmenistan: Blocked
  3. 2015

    VMess

    V2Ray's original protocol. Still everywhere, but replaced by VLESS.

    • Iran: No data
    • China: Blocked
    • Russia: No data
    • Turkmenistan: No data

2017–2022: look like the web

Random-looking traffic became a signal of its own: China has detected fully encrypted traffic since 2021. So tools moved inside ordinary HTTPS, and others reached out through volunteers and DNS.

  1. 2017

    Trojan

    Looks exactly like a normal HTTPS website, because it is one.

    • Iran: Degraded
    • China: Degraded
    • Russia: Degraded
    • Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)
  2. ~2019

    Tor Snowflake

    Reaches Tor through volunteers' browsers, looking like a video call.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: Degraded
    • Russia: Works
    • Turkmenistan: No data
  3. 2020

    VLESS

    Xray's flagship: a minimal protocol that leaves encryption to TLS or REALITY.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: Works
    • Russia: Works
    • Turkmenistan: Blocked
  4. 2020

    DNS tunnel (dnstt)

    Hides data inside DNS lookups. Very slow, but works when almost nothing else does.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: No data
    • Russia: No data
    • Turkmenistan: No data
  5. 2022

    Shadowsocks 2022

    The modern Shadowsocks: fixed keys, replay protection, faster.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: Degraded
    • Russia: Degraded
    • Turkmenistan: No data

2023: borrow a real site

REALITY removed the need for a domain or certificate by borrowing a real website's handshake. The same year, Hysteria2 made QUIC practical on bad links, and AmneziaWG gave WireGuard a disguise.

  1. 2023

    REALITY

    Borrows a real website's TLS handshake. No domain or certificate needed.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: Works
    • Russia: Works
    • Turkmenistan: Blocked
  2. 2023

    Hysteria2

    A QUIC proxy built for bad, lossy links. Looks like an HTTP/3 website.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: Degraded
    • Russia: Degraded
    • Turkmenistan: Blocked
  3. 2023 · v2 2025 · v3.1 2026

    AmneziaWG

    WireGuard with disguise: junk packets and random sizes so the handshake doesn't match.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: No data
    • Russia: Works
    • Turkmenistan: Degraded

2024–2026: the current edge

The newest work splits traffic into ordinary web requests and hides more of the connection itself. These have fewer apps and less field data, so treat their status as early.

  1. 2024

    XHTTP

    Splits the proxy into ordinary HTTP requests. Passes almost any CDN or middlebox.

    • Iran: Degraded
    • China: Works (inferred)
    • Russia: No data
    • Turkmenistan: Degraded
  2. 2024

    Tor WebTunnel

    Hides a Tor bridge behind a real website.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: Works
    • Russia: Degraded
    • Turkmenistan: No data
  3. 2025

    AnyTLS

    A newer TLS proxy that pads traffic to hide the TLS-inside-TLS pattern.

    • Iran: Works
    • China: No data
    • Russia: No data
    • Turkmenistan: No data
  4. RFC 2026

    ECH

    Encrypts the website name in the TLS hello.

    • Iran: No data
    • China: No data
    • Russia: Degraded
    • Turkmenistan: No data

What works in 2026

Six techniques that people actually choose between today. Most of this comes from user reports, often from one ISP and a few people.

Status in 2026 by country
TechniqueIranChinaRussiaTurkmenistan
VLESS + REALITYIran: WorksChina: WorksRussia: WorksTurkmenistan: Blocked
Hysteria2Iran: WorksChina: DegradedRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: Blocked
AmneziaWGIran: WorksChina: No dataRussia: WorksTurkmenistan: Degraded
VLESS via CDNIran: DegradedChina: Works (inferred)Russia: No dataTurkmenistan: Degraded
Tor SnowflakeIran: WorksChina: DegradedRussia: WorksTurkmenistan: No data
WireGuardIran: BlockedChina: Blocked (inferred)Russia: BlockedTurkmenistan: Blocked
See all 58 techniques in a table