Tunnel Atlas

The numbers · October 2026

All the numbers

Pick a dataset and read one table at a time. Tap a column heading to sort it.

App benchmark

Open an app's name for all its numbers on one page.

Mac lab: 24 apps, 2 rounds

Each app tunnels traffic to a test server on the same Mac, so no network is in the way and the numbers show the app's own cost. Ranked by speed (30%) and energy efficiency (70%).

Scroll the table sideways for every measure.

Mac lab results
Speed, Gbit/sAt 200 Mbit/sBuild
AppScoreof 100AverageUpload1 connectionDownload1 connectionUpload4 connectionsDownload4 connectionsEnergyJ per GBCPUs per GBMemoryMBCoreMTUVersion
Throne93.916.913.518.917.118.70.2885.1130.5sing-box and Xray40001.4.0-beta.3
sing-box CLI82.416.313.618.914.818.70.3424.8229.4sing-box40001.15.0-alpha.12
SFM81.39.5814.36.4412.77.250.2774.9536.7sing-box40641.15.0-alpha.12
Egern64.23.873.44.423.384.40.2634.256.67Own core40002.20.0
Surge57.910.211.89.2812.57.960.4638.66201Own core40006.10.0
Hiddify49.19.649.948.978.2411.80.5718.59191sing-box90005.0.0
FlClash48.410.511.49.4411.110.20.6051125.6mihomo40000.9.1
v2rayN46.28.697.3811.17.0510.10.59710.958.9sing-box and Xray40007.25.6
Clash Verge Rev45.77.728.238.66.547.680.57610.627.3mihomo40002.5.8
Koala Clash45.610.611.59.611.210.10.66210.425mihomo40001.5.0
Anywhere36.16.55.954.47.179.510.74913.18.09Own core40642.4
Shadowrocket31.81.961.472.371.542.760.5379.617.19Own core40642.2.92
Karing22.32.442.512.422.572.280.9816.816.2sing-box40001.2.1
HyperOrbit19.80.7120.5070.9830.5440.9490.686127.39Xray40001.5.4
Rabbit Hole18.92.834.211.094.133.391.3223.721.3mihomo40001.6.0
Clash (Hako)16.22.333.161.513.531.761.5227.122.7mihomo40641.0.14
OneXray12.71.151.231.130.9761.31.592023.2Xray150026.10.3
Tunna5.530.780.4480.4691.411.254.431.418.3Xray40641.6.7
susi connect4.120.7220.4320.4521.331.056.4829.821.4Xray13601.12.1
V2Box3.570.6310.4010.3241.121.097.5230.128.3Xray150010.1.9
Clash Plus2.680.5630.440.2850.9690.82710.836.116.4mihomo15001.4.1
Streisand2.30.5020.2450.2451.071.0112.835.721sing-box and Xray15001.6.76
incy2.260.4560.2410.2371.10.68712.634.916Xray15002.6.4
Happ1.930.3820.2240.2030.7470.63514.643.618.2Xray15006.1.0

Medians over all rounds. Open an app for the range of each measure.

iPhone lab: 7 apps, 3 rounds

The same test on an iPhone: the server runs inside a test app on the phone, so only the VPN app is in the way. Ranked by speed (30%) and energy efficiency (70%).

Scroll the table sideways for every measure.

iPhone lab results
Speed, Gbit/sAt 200 Mbit/sAt idleBuild
AppScoreof 100AverageUpload1 connectionDownload1 connectionUpload4 connectionsDownload4 connectionsPower addedmWExtra energyJ per GBCPUs per GBMemoryMBPower addedmWWakeupsper sVersion
Egern91.82.462.142.72.212.821556.26.876.3395.642.20.0
Anywhere633.273.182.433.543.973001218.76.192121.32.4
Shadowrocket49.51.160.7971.420.8761.8227110.815.46.141964.252.2.92
sing-box (SFI)250.50.2870.2980.9360.78150220.130.314.917.292.21.14.7
Hiddify16.80.3420.2650.2380.5090.42575630.252.125.988.81184.0.0
V2Box13.20.3550.1810.1820.7810.63197943.110315.239.470.610.1.9
Happ11.50.2380.1550.1320.390.40272244.386.613.146.257.56.1.0

Medians over all rounds. Open an app for the range of each measure.

Energy in real use, at 200 Mbit/s

One protocol

One protocol
AppSetupTestmWTimes Egern
EgernReality one hopreal path7.61.0×
AnywhereReality one hopreal path23.73.1×
ShadowrocketReality one hopreal path33.74.4×
AestateReality one hopreal path47.46.2×
WireGuard app 1.0.16WireGuardlab17022×
V2BoxShadowsockslab18825×
HappShadowsockslab36548×

Chain + rules

Chain + rules
AppSetupTestOne hop, mWExtra, mWTotal, mWTimes one hop
EgernReality chainreal path7.615.723.33.1×
EgernHysteria2 chainlab––78–
ShadowrocketReality chainreal path33.766.7100.43.0×
AnywhereReality chainreal path23.779.9103.64.4×

Notes on these numbers

The app's own energy, as macOS estimates it for the app's processes, at a 200 Mbit/s download (J per GB × 25). Real path = through real servers over the internet; the 14–15 Oct runs were at 100 Mbit/s, assuming the same energy per GB. Lab = a test server on the same Mac.

  • Lab tests used other protocols, so they compare only roughly with the real-path results.
  • Aestate was measured on 27 Oct at about 185 Mbit/s; Egern read 9 mW in that same run, so Aestate used about 5.4× Egern's energy on the day.
  • Chain: the outer protocol to a first server, Shadowsocks inside it to a second, plus everyday routing rules.
  • Egern's Hysteria2 chain is from a lab test on 25 Oct; Hysteria2 alone was not measured, so it has no split. In that lab Egern's Reality chain read 15 mW, so a real path may read higher.
  • Anywhere's chain was measured on version 2.4, its one hop on 2.3. Aestate has no domain routing, so it has no chain.

Who sees what, hop by hop

Each route from your device to the website.

Classic VPN

Censor sees a vpn handshake. Servers: 1 server. Delay: +1 RTT (WireGuard).

Classic VPN, hop by hop
HopFinal websiteYour IPSite nameContentWhat happens
Your device
VPN app
Sees itSees itSees itSees it
The VPN wraps every IP packet (TCP, UDP, everything) in an encrypted tunnel.
Censor
DPI
Can't see itSees itCan't see itCan't see it
Your country's filter (DPI) sits on the path. It sees every packet's addresses and timing, and tries to classify the traffic. WireGuard's first byte is a plaintext message type and its handshake has fixed sizes, so it is easy to recognise. Iran blackholed it after the handshake in June 2026; Russia blocks it since 2023.
VPN server
decrypt + NAT
Sees itSees itSees itPartly: only non-HTTPS
Decrypts the packet and sends it on from its own IP. It sees every site you visit (but not inside HTTPS).
Website
sees the VPN IP
Sees itCan't see itSees itSees it
The site sees the VPN server's address, not yours.

REALITY self-steal

Censor sees visit to your own site. Servers: 1 server. Delay: +2 RTT (TCP + TLS).

REALITY self-steal, hop by hop
HopFinal websiteYour IPSite nameContentWhat happens
Your device
VLESS client
Sees itSees itSees itSees it
Same REALITY client, but the name it shows is your own domain.
Censor
DPI
Can't see itSees itPartly: your domainCan't see it
Your country's filter (DPI) sits on the path. It sees every packet's addresses and timing, and tries to classify the traffic. Name, DNS and IP all agree, so the name-vs-IP check finds nothing. In Russia one user reported it working without problems (Oct 2026). In this site's own field test it ran at ~70 Mbps where a borrowed name got 1–2.
Your server
REALITY + web
Sees itSees itSees itPartly: only non-HTTPS
Failed logins go to your own web server (nginx with a real Let's Encrypt certificate) on the same machine, so probes see a real site.
Website
sees VPS IP
Sees itCan't see itSees itSees it
Sees your server's address.

QUIC (Hysteria2)

Censor sees udp / http/3. Servers: 1 server. Delay: +1 RTT, 0 later.

QUIC (Hysteria2), hop by hop
HopFinal websiteYour IPSite nameContentWhat happens
Your device
Hy2 client
Sees itSees itSees itSees it
One QUIC connection carries all streams. Login is an HTTP/3 request; Salamander scrambles every packet.
Censor
DPI
Can't see itSees itCan't see it: with SalamanderCan't see it
Your country's filter (DPI) sits on the path. It sees every packet's addresses and timing, and tries to classify the traffic. Plain QUIC shows its server name (China blocks QUIC by name since Apr 2024; a 2026 study saw Iran block all QUIC at one data-centre vantage point in Jun–Jul 2025). With Salamander it's random UDP, which works until a network drops unknown UDP.
Hy2 server
masquerade
Sees itSees itSees itPartly: only non-HTTPS
Without the password it behaves like an ordinary HTTP/3 web server (only with Salamander off; with it on, probes can't connect at all). Port hopping (switching ports every 30 s) defeats per-port UDP throttling.
Website
sees server IP
Sees itCan't see itSees itSees it
Sees the server's address.

CDN-fronted

Censor sees https to a cdn. Servers: cdn + server. Delay: +2–3 RTT, longer path.

CDN-fronted, hop by hop
HopFinal websiteYour IPSite nameContentWhat happens
Your device
proxy app
Sees itSees itSees itSees it
Connects to a CDN edge IP (Cloudflare or similar) with your domain, using WebSocket, gRPC or XHTTP requests.
Censor
DPI
Can't see itSees itPartly: your domainCan't see it
Your country's filter (DPI) sits on the path. It sees every packet's addresses and timing, and tries to classify the traffic. It sees HTTPS to an IP shared with millions of sites, so blocking the IP is costly. It can still block your domain by name: Iran did within ~24 h in June 2026, even with packet fragmentation (one report).
CDN edge
Cloudflare
Can't see itSees itSees itPartly: HTTP layer only
Ends the TLS, reads the HTTP requests (paths, headers) and forwards them to your server over a second TLS connection. It can close your account.
Origin server
Xray
Sees itPartly: via headerSees itPartly: only non-HTTPS
Your server, hidden behind the CDN. It sees the CDN's address plus a forwarded header with yours.
Website
sees origin IP
Sees itCan't see itSees itSees it
Sees your origin server's address.

Relay chain

Censor sees a domestic connection. Servers: 2 servers. Delay: +1 relay hop (~2× RTT).

Relay chain, hop by hop
HopFinal websiteYour IPSite nameContentWhat happens
Your device
proxy app
Sees itSees itSees itSees it
Connects to a server inside your own country. Domestic sites go direct (split routing).
ISP filter
domestic DPI
Can't see itSees itPartly: relay's nameCan't see it
Your ISP sees a connection to a domestic data-centre. Domestic traffic is filtered less, though in the 2026 shutdown even Iran's national network was cut at times.
Relay
in-country VPS
Sees itSees itSees itPartly: only non-HTTPS
Decrypts the first leg, routes local sites directly, and sends the rest abroad over one multiplexed link. Some data-centres drop UDP abroad, so this leg is often TCP-only.
Border gateway
international
Can't see itCan't see itPartly: exit's nameCan't see it
Your country's filter (DPI) sits on the path. It sees every packet's addresses and timing, and tries to classify the traffic. Here it sees a data-centre talking to a foreign server: a second REALITY session, without your IP.
Exit server
US VPS
Sees itCan't see itSees itPartly: only non-HTTPS
Sees the relay, not you. Mux (smux) cuts the new-connection delay from ~512 to ~162 ms in a field test.
Website
sees exit IP
Sees itCan't see itSees itSees it
Sees the exit's address.

DNS tunnel

Censor sees dns lookups. Servers: resolver + server. Delay: Very high.

DNS tunnel, hop by hop
HopFinal websiteYour IPSite nameContentWhat happens
Your device
dnstt / Slipstream
Sees itSees itSees itSees it
Encodes your data in DNS lookups for a domain you control.
Domestic resolver
ISP DNS
Can't see itSees itPartly: your tunnel domainCan't see it
Your country's own DNS server looks the name up for you. It must still be able to reach abroad, which some did during Iran's 2026 blackout.
Censor
DPI
Can't see itCan't see itPartly: tunnel domainCan't see it
Your country's filter (DPI) sits on the path. It sees every packet's addresses and timing, and tries to classify the traffic. It sees the resolver doing DNS lookups, which almost no network can switch off completely.
Your DNS server
tunnel end
Sees itCan't see itSees itPartly: only non-HTTPS
Answers the lookups with your data and forwards your traffic onward.
Website
sees server IP
Sees itCan't see itSees itSees it
Sees your server's address.

What works in each country, 2026

Mostly user reports on net4people, often from one ISP and a few people. Outlined = inferred or unconfirmed.

Iran

Status in Iran, 2026
TechniqueStatusLatest report
AmneziaWG Works
Reported working, Jun 2026 (n4p #628)
Shadowsocks / SS2022 Works
'Works great', late Jul 2026 (n4p #640)
VLESS + REALITY Works
Working again from mid-Jun 2026; needs IP rotation. Borrowed names throttled, self-steal fine (field test)
Hysteria2 Works
All ISPs except Rightel (one user), 13 Jun 2026; fails in blackouts and where UDP is dropped
AnyTLS Works
All ISPs except Rightel, Jun 2026
Tor Snowflake Works
Most-used Tor transport in Iran (2025)
Tor WebTunnel Works
Bridges via Telegram (2025)
Psiphon Works
Main method in late Jan 2026; failed at times
DNS tunnels Works
Slow, but worked through the Feb–May 2026 blackout
IKEv2/IPsec Degraded
Own field test: usable only as a server-to-server overlay (Oct 2026)
VLESS via CDN Degraded
Works at times (up to 150 Mbps); domains blocked within ~24 h (one report)
Trojan Degraded
Domain and IP blocked after use, Jun 2026
Plain HTTP disguise (port 80) Degraded
Some ISPs only (Iranian blog, 2025); an HTTP prefix passed a protocol allowlist for 4 weeks (study, 2023–25 data)
WireGuard Blocked
Blackholed after handshake, Jun 2026 (one report, n4p #628)
TUIC / plain QUIC Blocked
All QUIC blocked at one vantage point, Jun–Jul 2025 (FOCI 2026)
ClientHello fragmentation Blocked
Stopped working ~27 Jul 2026: fragmented hellos dropped (n4p #640); reassembly seen from Jun (n4p #628)
MASQUE Blocked
All QUIC blocked at one vantage point, Jun–Jul 2025 (n4p #648)
OpenVPN No data (inferred)
No 2026 source
VMess No data
Largely replaced by VLESS
NaiveProxy No data
–
Tor obfs4 No data
–

China

Status in China, 2026
TechniqueStatusLatest report
VLESS + REALITY Works
Replay-probe risk on some targets (Xray #6121)
VLESS via CDN Works (inferred)
CDN collateral damage; no 2026 measurement
NaiveProxy Works (inferred)
Chrome network stack; no 2026 measurement
Tor WebTunnel Works
Works where obfs4 fails
Shadowsocks / SS2022 Degraded
Classic SS mostly blocked, SS2022 degraded: fully-encrypted detection since 2021 (USENIX 2023)
Trojan Degraded
TLS-in-TLS detectable
Hysteria2 Degraded
Residential UDP QoS cuts long sessions
TUIC / plain QUIC Degraded
QUIC blocked by name since Apr 2024
Tor Snowflake Degraded
Blocked in Fujian, Aug 2026
WireGuard Blocked (inferred)
Handshake fingerprintable; no 2026 source
OpenVPN Blocked (inferred)
Well known; no 2026 source
IKEv2/IPsec Blocked (inferred)
Unconfirmed; no 2026 source
VMess Blocked
Fully-encrypted detection (USENIX 2023)
Tor obfs4 Blocked
Allowlist-style filters reject it (Tor WebTunnel blog, 2024)
AmneziaWG No data
–
AnyTLS No data
–
ClientHello fragmentation No data
–
Plain HTTP disguise (port 80) No data
–
MASQUE No data
–
Psiphon No data
–
DNS tunnels No data
–

Russia

Status in Russia, 2026
TechniqueStatusLatest report
AmneziaWG Works
Works, but servers caught in mass IP bans, Aug–Sep 2026 (n4p #671)
VLESS + REALITY Works
Self-steal reported working (one user, Oct 2026); popular VPS providers' IPs mass-banned
Tor Snowflake Works
DTLS filtering from 30 Mar 2026; one user: working again in Sep (n4p #603)
Shadowsocks / SS2022 Degraded
Reportedly blockable (2024); keep first packets small (n4p #673)
Trojan Degraded
~15–20 KB freeze on TLS to foreign hosting, since mid-2025 (n4p #490)
Hysteria2 Degraded
UDP blocked on mobile
TUIC / plain QUIC Degraded
QUIC v1 name filter since 2023
Tor obfs4 Degraded
Blocked on some 4G networks, late 2024
Tor WebTunnel Degraded
Most bridges listed from Jun 2025
WireGuard Blocked
Blocking began 2023 (Mediazona)
OpenVPN Blocked
Blocking began 2023
IKEv2/IPsec Blocked
Reportedly blocked, Jun 2024 (Moscow Times)
VMess No data
–
VLESS via CDN No data
Under mobile allowlists only allowlisted destinations work, whatever the protocol (n4p #579)
AnyTLS No data
–
NaiveProxy No data
–
ClientHello fragmentation No data
–
Plain HTTP disguise (port 80) No data
–
MASQUE No data
–
Psiphon No data
–
DNS tunnels No data
National DNS may limit them

Turkmenistan

Status in Turkmenistan, 2026
TechniqueStatusLatest report
AmneziaWG Degraded
Banned after moderate traffic (one user, Aug 2026); a low-traffic server lasted 2 years (2025)
VLESS via CDN Degraded
Only thing that somewhat works; CDN IPs and domains often blocked (n4p #523, 2025)
WireGuard Blocked
Likely: foreign IPs banned after moderate traffic, whatever the protocol (n4p #523)
OpenVPN Blocked (inferred)
Unconfirmed
VLESS + REALITY Blocked
IPs banned after moderate traffic (n4p #523)
Trojan Blocked (inferred)
Likely; no 2026 source
Hysteria2 Blocked
Banned with and without Salamander and port hopping
TUIC / plain QUIC Blocked (inferred)
Likely; no 2026 source
IKEv2/IPsec No data
–
Shadowsocks / SS2022 No data
–
VMess No data
–
AnyTLS No data
–
NaiveProxy No data
–
ClientHello fragmentation No data
–
Plain HTTP disguise (port 80) No data
–
Tor obfs4 No data
Bridges reported blocked, Jan 2026; transport not named (Tor forum)
Tor Snowflake No data
–
Tor WebTunnel No data
–
MASQUE No data
–
Psiphon No data
–
DNS tunnels No data
–

All 58 techniques

✓ works, ~ degraded, ✕ blocked, – no data; outlined = inferred.

All techniques with status in 2026
TechniqueYearIranChinaRussiaTurkmenistanFamilyClassConnectionPhone powerWhat it is
ECHRFC 2026Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: No dataDisguise layerCutting edgeTCPModerate
Encrypts the website name in the TLS hello.
Finalmask2026Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataDisguise layerCutting edgeAnyHigh
Disguises every packet; can tunnel through DNS or ping (ICMP).
XDRIVE2026Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTransportCutting edgeTCPModerate
Moves proxy data through cloud-storage services.
paqet2026Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersCutting edgeRaw IPHigh
Sends raw packets with KCP, skipping the normal network stack.
AnyTLS2025Iran: WorksChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataLooks like HTTPSCutting edgeTCPModerate
A newer TLS proxy that pads traffic to hide the TLS-inside-TLS pattern.
ShadowQUIC2025Iran: Blocked (inferred)China: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataQUIC / UDPCutting edgeQUICHigh
A new QUIC proxy that borrows a real site's handshake, like REALITY for QUIC.
Sudoku2025Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataRandom-looking proxyCutting edgeTCPModerate
A new protocol aimed at looking less random than Shadowsocks-style traffic.
TrustTunnel2025Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataLooks like HTTPSCutting edgeTCP + UDPModerate
A VPN-style tunnel over HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
VLESS Encryption2025Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataDisguise layerCutting edgeAnyModerate
Adds post-quantum encryption inside VLESS itself.
Slipstream / XDNS2024–2026Iran: WorksChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersCutting edgeDNSHighest
Faster DNS tunnels from the 2026 blackouts.
Tor WebTunnel2024Iran: WorksChina: WorksRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersCutting edgeTCPHigh
Hides a Tor bridge behind a real website.
XHTTP2024Iran: DegradedChina: Works (inferred)Russia: No dataTurkmenistan: DegradedTransportCutting edgeTCPModerate
Splits the proxy into ordinary HTTP requests. Passes almost any CDN or middlebox.
AmneziaWG2023 · v2 2025 · v3.1 2026Iran: WorksChina: No dataRussia: WorksTurkmenistan: DegradedClassic VPNCutting edgeUDPLow
WireGuard with disguise: junk packets and random sizes so the handshake doesn't match.
HTTPUpgrade2023Iran: Degraded (inferred)China: Works (inferred)Russia: Works (inferred)Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)TransportPopularTCPModerate
A lighter WebSocket: does the upgrade, then sends raw bytes.
Hysteria22023Iran: WorksChina: DegradedRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: BlockedQUIC / UDPPopularQUICHigh
A QUIC proxy built for bad, lossy links. Looks like an HTTP/3 website.
REALITY2023Iran: WorksChina: WorksRussia: WorksTurkmenistan: BlockedDisguise layerPopularTCPModerate
Borrows a real website's TLS handshake. No domain or certificate needed.
Salamander2023Iran: WorksChina: DegradedRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: BlockedDisguise layerPopularUDPHigh
Scrambles Hysteria2 packets so they no longer look like QUIC.
TUIC v52023Iran: BlockedChina: DegradedRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)QUIC / UDPPopularQUICHigh
A lean QUIC proxy that can send data with zero round trips.
Juicity2023Iran: Blocked (inferred)China: Degraded (inferred)Russia: Degraded (inferred)Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)QUIC / UDPLegacyQUICHigh
A QUIC proxy from the dae project. Gone quiet.
MASQUERFC 2022–23Iran: Blocked (inferred)China: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataClassic VPNCutting edgeQUICHigh
A VPN carried inside HTTP/3, so it looks like ordinary web traffic. Powers Cloudflare WARP.
ShadowTLS v32022 · v3 2023Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataLooks like HTTPSPopularTCPModerate
Does a real handshake with a trusted website, then switches to your proxy data.
Shadowsocks 20222022Iran: WorksChina: DegradedRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: No dataRandom-looking proxyPopularTCP + UDPModerate
The modern Shadowsocks: fixed keys, replay protection, faster.
XTLS Vision2022Iran: WorksChina: WorksRussia: WorksTurkmenistan: BlockedDisguise layerPopularTCPModerate
Hides the 'TLS inside TLS' pattern that gives most TLS proxies away.
Cloudflare quick tunnel2021Iran: Degraded (inferred)China: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersPopularTCPModerate
A free, throwaway Cloudflare hostname that reaches your server even when its IP is blocked.
Mieru2021Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataRandom-looking proxyPopularTCP + UDPModerate
An encrypted proxy with random padding, from an independent developer.
gRPC2021Iran: DegradedChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTransportPopularTCPModerate
Carries the proxy as gRPC calls over HTTP/2. CDN-friendly.
DNS tunnel (dnstt)2020Iran: WorksChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersPopularDNSHighest
Hides data inside DNS lookups. Very slow, but works when almost nothing else does.
VLESS2020Iran: WorksChina: WorksRussia: WorksTurkmenistan: BlockedLooks like HTTPSPopularTCPModerate
Xray's flagship: a minimal protocol that leaves encryption to TLS or REALITY.
Hysteria (v1)2020Iran: Blocked (inferred)China: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataQUIC / UDPLegacyUDPHigh
The first Hysteria. Replaced by Hysteria2.
NaiveProxy2019Iran: No dataChina: Works (inferred)Russia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataLooks like HTTPSPopularTCPModerate
Uses Chrome's own network code, so its fingerprint is a real browser's.
Tor Snowflake~2019Iran: WorksChina: DegradedRussia: WorksTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersPopularUDPHigh
Reaches Tor through volunteers' browsers, looking like a video call.
WARP / multi-exit outbound2019Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersPopularUDPModerate
Sends the server's outgoing traffic through Cloudflare WARP (or Psiphon, Proton) to fix sites that block data-centre IPs.
Cloak2018Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataDisguise layerPopularTCPModerate
Makes OpenVPN or Shadowsocks look like HTTPS.
MTProto proxy2018Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersPopularTCPModerate
Telegram's own proxy. Works for Telegram only.
Snell~2018Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataLooks like HTTPSPopularTCPModerate
Surge's own closed-source protocol.
HTTP/2 transport~2018Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTransportLegacyTCPModerate
The old HTTP/2 transport. Removed from Xray in Dec 2024 (merged into XHTTP).
Brook2017Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataRandom-looking proxyPopularTCP + UDPModerate
A one-binary proxy with its own simple protocol and a WebSocket mode for CDNs.
ClientHello fragmentation~2017 · Xray 2023Iran: BlockedChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataDisguise layerPopularTCPModerate
Cuts the TLS hello into pieces so a simple filter can't read the site name.
Trojan2017Iran: DegradedChina: DegradedRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)Looks like HTTPSPopularTCPModerate
Looks exactly like a normal HTTPS website, because it is one.
uTLS fingerprints~2017Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataDisguise layerPopularTCPModerate
Makes the proxy's TLS hello look exactly like Chrome, Firefox or Safari.
WebSocket2016Iran: DegradedChina: Works (inferred)Russia: No dataTurkmenistan: DegradedTransportPopularTCPModerate
Carries the proxy inside a WebSocket, so it can pass through CDNs like Cloudflare.
HTTP header disguise~2016Iran: DegradedChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataDisguise layerLegacyTCPModerate
Dresses the connection up as plain, unencrypted web traffic, e.g. a request to google.com.
mKCP2016Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTransportLegacyUDPHigh
An old UDP transport that trades bandwidth for speed on lossy links.
simple-obfs / v2ray-plugin2016–2019Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataDisguise layerLegacyTCPModerate
Old Shadowsocks plugins that wrap it in fake HTTP or WebSocket.
WireGuard2015 · stable 2020Iran: BlockedChina: Blocked (inferred)Russia: BlockedTurkmenistan: BlockedClassic VPNPopularUDPLow
The modern VPN: small, fast, and silent when idle. Not built to hide.
ShadowsocksR2015Iran: No dataChina: Blocked (inferred)Russia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataRandom-looking proxyLegacyTCP + UDPModerate
A Shadowsocks fork with obfuscation plugins. Unmaintained.
VMess2015Iran: No dataChina: BlockedRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataRandom-looking proxyLegacyTCPModerate
V2Ray's original protocol. Still everywhere, but replaced by VLESS.
Tor obfs42014Iran: No dataChina: BlockedRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersPopularTCPHigh
Tor's default bridge disguise: random-looking bytes.
Tor meek2014Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersLegacyTCPHigh
Domain fronting through a CDN. Mostly dead since 2018.
Tailscale / ZeroTier2013–2019Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataClassic VPNPopularUDPModerate
Mesh VPNs that link your own devices directly, punching through home routers.
Shadowsocks2012 · AEAD 2017Iran: WorksChina: BlockedRussia: DegradedTurkmenistan: No dataRandom-looking proxyPopularTCP + UDPModerate
The original anti-censorship proxy: encrypt everything so it looks like random noise.
SSTP2007Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataClassic VPNLegacyTCPHighest
Microsoft's VPN over HTTPS. Windows-only and slow.
IKEv2/IPsec2005Iran: DegradedChina: Blocked (inferred)Russia: BlockedTurkmenistan: No dataClassic VPNPopularUDPModerate
The VPN built into iPhones, Macs and Windows. Fast and runs in the system kernel.
OpenVPN2001Iran: No data (inferred)China: Blocked (inferred)Russia: BlockedTurkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)Classic VPNPopularTCP + UDPHighest
The classic open-source VPN. Flexible, but heavy and easy to detect.
L2TP/IPsec1999Iran: Blocked (inferred)China: Blocked (inferred)Russia: BlockedTurkmenistan: No dataClassic VPNLegacyUDPModerate
A tunnel (L2TP) wrapped in IPsec for encryption. Double-wrapped and slow.
SOCKS5 / HTTP proxy1996Iran: Blocked (inferred)China: Blocked (inferred)Russia: Blocked (inferred)Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)Random-looking proxyPopularTCP + UDPModerate
The basic, unencrypted proxy. Used locally between an app and its core.
PPTP~1996Iran: Blocked (inferred)China: Blocked (inferred)Russia: Blocked (inferred)Turkmenistan: Blocked (inferred)Classic VPNLegacyTCPLow
Microsoft's early VPN. Broken encryption; removed from iPhones.
SSH tunnel1995Iran: No dataChina: No dataRussia: No dataTurkmenistan: No dataTor, DNS and othersPopularTCPModerate
Uses a normal SSH login as a proxy. Everywhere, but slow over distance.